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Group size and Network Formation ∗
Isabel Melguizo†
1 Introduction
Interactions among individuals are greatly shaped by their socio-economic attributes.
In fact, similarity in attributes is a strong predictor of tie formation. This phe-
nomenon is pervasive and known as homophily.1 The seminal work by Schelling
[1969] further postulates a striking result, namely, segregation arises even in the
case in which individuals are happy with a mixed society.
This paper studies processes of integration and segregation using a variation of
the symmetric connections model by Jackson and Wolinsky [1996]. In contrast to
Jackson and Wolinsky [1996] in which individuals are homogeneous, in this paper
individuals are of two types, for instance, defined according to an exogenous di-
chotomous trait, and exhibit preferences that resemble those in Schelling [1969].
In particular, individuals derive more utility from relations as long as in its neigh-
borhood, their own type is represented above a given fraction. Individuals might
have preferences for being surrounded by similar types because is easier to assess
their performance in Bagues and Perez-Villadoniga [2013]. In a similar vein Rem-
pel [2017] concludes how people trust more similar others. Interaction costs are
higher between different than between similar types. That may reflect disutility of
interracial contacts as Battu et al. [2007] and De Mart´ı and Zenou [2017] argue.
Conceptually, this model can be seen as a threshold model of collective action, as
Schelling [1969], Schelling [1971] and Granovetter [1978]. In this respect Card et al.
[2008] document how in fact whites’ actions, specifically, migration patterns, exhibit
threshold-like behavior regarding blacks population shares. The magnitude of this
threshold is shown to be related to whites attitudes towards interracial contact and
also to income levels of blacks and whites.
The main question is which networks emerge in equilibrium when individuals
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1See McPherson et al. [2001] for a comprehensive survey on this topic.
exhibit the aforementioned preferences. As in Jackson and Wolinsky [1996] and
Jackson and Rogers [2005] the equilibrium concept is pairwise stability. That is the
simplest concept in which individuals have discretion on whether to sever and form
relations, overcoming the coordination problems that might arise in Nash equilib-
rium, in which, dominated strategies, might lead to empty equilibrium networks.2
Briefly a network is pairwise stable (henceforth, PS) whenever individuals involved
in a relation do not want to terminate it and individuals not involved in a relation
do not want to establish it. Other papers studying network formation with this
focus are De Mart´ı and Zenou [2017], McBride [2006], Johnson and Gilles [2003]
and Iijima and Kamada [2017].
Among the previous papers, the closest ones to the current proposal are De Mart´ı
and Zenou [2017] and Johnson and Gilles [2003]. De Mart´ı and Zenou [2017] propose
an interesting specification in which interactions costs are endogenous and higher
between than within communities. Specifically, intercommunity costs are increasing
in the relative number of friends of the same type an individual has. Due to the
combinatorial complexity that the model entails there are some potentially interest-
ing question that remains to be exploited, as a deeper understanding of the tension
between efficiency and stability with an analysis of transfer systems that conciliate
both perspectives. In contrast, in the current paper cost are exogenous. By propos-
ing a simpler model in terms of combinatorial complexity the current paper goes
further in exploiting the trade-off between efficiency and stability and describing seg-
regation patterns of equilibrium networks. Johnson and Gilles [2003] also consider
exogenous costs, that depend on the physical distance between individuals located
on the real line. That is the source of heterogeneity. The cost structure in the cur-
rent paper can be seen as the dichotomous version of the one above. On the benefit
side, in the current proposal utility differs with group composition. In contrast to
us Johnson and Gilles [2003] do not carry over an analysis of transfers. Further,
the relation between segregation and network structure, present in this proposal, is
absent in these two aforementioned approaches.
More deeply, the focus of the paper is on the following aspects:
Stability and uniqueness. The analysis is on the conditions under which the
completely integrated and segregated networks emerge as equilibria. Completely in-
tegrated networks (henceforth, CI) are those in which everyone is connected. Briefly,
for CI to be PS the linking costs with individuals of different type should be suf-
ficiently low. For completely segregated network (henceforth, CS) to be PS, the
opposite has to hold. Conditions slightly vary as a function of group size, since
individuals are concerned with being in a minority group. In contrast to Jackson
and Wolinsky [1996], CS naturally emerges as equilibrium due to cost heterogeneity.
2See Jackson [2008] for a discussion.
Also in contrast, when CI is PS, is not the unique one. Intuitively, individuals do
not always prefer forming new connections, particularly if that leaves their type as
a minority in her neighborhood. In this case, there is a full characterization of the
class of networks that are PS. These networks exhibit full intraconnection, a situa-
tion in which similar types are all connected. Further, regarding links with different
types there are three cases: (i) every individual is connected to all individuals of
different type, i.e., CI, (ii) each individual of the minority type in the population
exactly links to the number of individuals of the majority type that matches the
population size of the minority type and (iii) any combination in which some indi-
viduals of the minority type connect to all individuals of the majority type and some
others connects to the number of individuals of the majority type that matches the
population size of the minority group.
Welfare. There is an examination on whether equilibrium networks are also the
most socially preferable, in the sense of maximizing the sum of individual utilities.
As in Jackson and Wolinsky [1996] there is a tension between efficiency and stabil-
ity. It is direct to see that CS is not the most socially preferable when PS, since
links between the two communities of different generate positive externalities. In
particular, a network that bridges the two communities with one link might be so-
cially preferable to CS. There are transfers among individuals that make that bridge
network PS. These transfers may reduce inequality among society members.
Segregation and network structures. To assess the segregation that equilibrium
networks induce, the focus is on the Spectral Segregation Index by Echenique and
Fryer [2007]. Unlike other indexes assessing segregation, as the Dissimilarity or
the Isolation Indexes, the Spectral Segregation Index fully relies on individual in-
teractions. The main insight is that there is no a one to one mapping between
segregation and welfare. In particular there are networks equally desirable from a
welfare perspective, exhibiting different levels of segregation.
2 The model
There is a finite population of n ≥ 3 individuals. Individuals are of two types, A
and B. Let nt be the number of individuals of type t = {A,B} in the population
and set nA ≥ nB, w.l.o.g. Let n =
∑
t nt.
Network of relations. Individuals are connected by an undirected network denoted
g. Let gij = gji = 1 if individual i is friend with individual j and gij = gji = 0
otherwise. Let t(i) denote the type of individual i. The set of neighbors of individual
i in network g is Ni(g) = {j 6= i|gij = 1}. With some abuse of notation let Ni(g)
also denote the cardinality of this set. Analogously, the set (and the cardinality)
of neighbors of individual i in network g that are of same type is Nsi (g) = {j 6=
i|gij = 1 and t(i) = t(j)}. Let the fraction of individuals of same type than i in her
neighborhood be p ≡ N
s
i (g) + 1
Ni(g) + 1
.
Preferences. As in Jackson and Wolinsky [1996] individuals derive utility from
direct as well as indirect connections. In contrast, individuals derive utility of
0 < δ < 1 from each of their connections whenever their own type represents at
least one half in their neighborhood and utility 0 < β < δ of when this fraction is
smaller than one half. Indirect connections follow the same structure with a decay
term.3 Specifically, the value of an indirect connection between i and j decays with
its geodesic distance, namely d(i, j).4 The main reason to use one half as a thresh-
old according to which utility changes is twofold: first, since the concern is whether
groups of same type individuals represent a given fraction of the population and
pairwise stability involves only one link deviations, the same results on equilibrium
networks could be replicated by adapting the conditions regarding to whether one
link deviation causes an individual i type to be sufficiently represented in her neigh-
borhood. The problem becomes more a technical than a substantive one. Second,
Schelling [1971] uses this fraction in the main arguments. Also, in a reexamination
of Schelling proposal, Fagiolo et al. [2007] uses this threshold. In broad terms one
half can be understood as a focal point. Regarding cost, only direct links are costly.
Establishing links is cheaper between same type individuals than between different
type individuals. Specifically, cij = c if t(i) = t(j) and cij = C if t(i) 6= t(j) with
C > c. The utility of individual i in network g is:
ui(g) =

∑
j∈g
δd(i,j) − ∑
j∈Ni(g)
cij if p ≥ 0.5∑
j∈g
βd(i,j) − ∑
j∈Ni(g)
cij if p < 0.5
.
Equilibrium networks. The equilibrium concept is pairwise stability. Let g + ij
denote the network g when the link ij. Analogously g − ij denotes the network g
when the link ij has been deleted. Pairwise stability is defined as follows:
Definition. A network g is PS if:
1. For all ij ∈ g, ui(g) ≥ ui(g − ij) and uj(g) ≥ uj(g − ij).
2. For all ij /∈ g, if ui(g + ij) > ui(g) then uj(g + ij) < uj(g).
Pairwise stability requires that no individual gains from severing an existing link
and no pair of individuals that are not connected both gain from forming a direct
3Notice that the neighborhood of individual i is defined as the individuals with whom i has direct connections.
There is a brief discussion at the end of the paper on how the model changes when the definition of neighborhood
is beyond direct connections.
4The geodesic distance between i and j is the minimum number of links needed from i to reach j. If i does not
reach j, d(i, j) =∞.
link with each other. Thus, mutual consent is needed to form a link while link
severance can be done unilaterally.
Before the results it is worthwhile to briefly analyze the characteristics of this
model in relation to Schelling’s proposal. While in Schelling’ proposal individuals
are located on a fixed grid (a line if individuals are defined on one dimension), here
the focus is on more general network structures. Moreover in the current proposal
mutual consent is needed for a link to be formed while in Schelling’s proposal agents
choose unilaterally to change their positions to another that is available. With
respect to the utility function, in the current proposal, conditional on having the
same number of direct and (length of) indirect connections, an individual is better
off whenever, in her neighborhood, her type represents at least one half of the
population. The next example illustrates it:
Example 1. Consider the following networks. Focus on the individual of type A
above on the left, establishing links with three individuals:
A A
AA
A B
AA
A B
BA
A B
BB
For the sake of exposition, first consider a simpler case in which c = C. Recall
that p ≡ N
s
A(g) + 1
NA(g) + 1
. From left to right uA = 3(δ − c) in the first three networks
since p ≥ 0.5, while uA = 3(β − c) in the last one, since p = 0.25. Utility of A has
the following shape:5
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Notice that the individual of type A is indifferent among the first three config-
urations. In particular, there is no strict preference for a segregated neighborhood,
i.,e., for p being 1, over a mixed one. That is parallel to Schelling. Observe that in
this case CS is never PS. Since any link costs the same, there is not rationale behind
that fact that an individual wants to link with some individuals and not with others.
Thus, whenever individuals are indifferent between different levels of integration be-
cause links are equally costly, in contrast to Schelling, segregation does not emerge.
The current model considers C > c. Thus utility looks like:
5When there is no risk of ambiguity we describe an individual i by her type.
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From left to right uA is 3(δ−c) > 2(δ−c)+(δ−C) > (δ−c)+2(δ−C) > 3(β−C).
Was the number of connections fixed, the individual is also happier whenever in her
neighborhood their type represent at least one half. Since links are more costly when
happen between individual of different types, utility is increasing in the number of
links with same type individuals. As in the current model the number of connections
matter, a trade-off between the quantity of links and its nature arises. Despite of
segregation being strictly preferred when the number of links is fixed, there are costs
configurations for which CI is PS. Thus, links quantity plays a crucial role.
3 Results
3.1 Pairwise stable segregated and integrated networks
This section analyses two polar networks. The case in which all individuals are
connected to each other, namely, CI, and the case which there are two groups of same
type individuals that are completely connected among themselves and completely
isolated from the other group, namely, CS. The results are as follows:
Proposition 1. Let nA = nB. Then:
1. CI is PS iff C ≤ δ − δ2.
2. CS is PS iff C > δ + δ2 (nB − 1) and c ≤ δ − δ2.
Proposition 2. Let nA > nB. Then:
1. Whenever nB = nA − 1, CI is PS iff C ≤ (n− 1)(β − δ) + δ − δ2.
2. Whenever nB < nA − 1, CI is PS iff C ≤ min{δ − δ2, β − β2}.
3. CS is PS iff C > δ + δ2(nB − 1) and c ≤ δ − δ2.
When the cost of maintaining links with same type individuals is sufficiently
low while maintaining links with different type individuals is sufficiently costly, CS
emerges as equilibrium. In contrast, CI requires that the cost of linking to different
type individuals is small enough. The fraction of types A and B in the population
slightly alters the conditions under which these networks emerge as equilibria. In
particular, under nB = nA − 1 when types B evaluate whether to sever a link with
types A in CI, B types represents exactly one half of its neighborhood, that is why
δ and β both enter into play at the margin.6
The next result explores uniqueness:
Proposition 3. Let CS be PS, then it is unique. Let CI be PS. Then, when nA−1 =
nB it is unique and when nA = nB or nA − 1 > nB it is not unique. In the latter
case, fully intraconnected networks in which one of the following configurations holds
may be also PS:
1. Each type B is connected to nB types A.
2. Some types B are connected to all types A and the remaining types B are
connected to nB types A.
The reasons as to why CI is not unique come from different sources depending
on whether nA = nB or nA − 1 > nB. When nA = nB and similar types break
their type becomes a minority in her neighborhood. Hence they lose a lot from
that action. Thus for a wider range of cost of linking similar types, c (in relation
to the case in which nA − 1 > nB) she is willing to maintain similar types links.
These wider range for c open the possibility for makes networks to be PS. The next
example illustrates it:
Example 2. Let nA = nB. The bipartite network in which each individual is
connected to all individuals of different type and there are no others links is PS iff
C ≤ β − β3 and c > β − β2. Recall that CI is PS under c < C ≤ δ − δ2. Let
β−β3 < δ− δ2 and c < C ∈ (β−β2, β−β3). Hence there are costs structures such
that both CI and the bipartite network are PS.
A B
BA
A B
When nA − 1 > nB, B when individuals of type B break, they are in minority
either way. Thus there are not losing a lot for that action. Hence to make the CI
network PS, cost of linking with similar types have to be small. That precludes
6In Appendix 2: Propositions 8, 9 and 10 are the counterparts of Proposition 1 and 2 with δi and βi.
any non fully intraconnected network from being PS. The next example illustrates
networks that are PS, apart from the CI.
Example 3. A PS network, as the one described in point 1 of Proposition 3. For
nA = 4 and nA∗ = nB = 2, δ = 0.9 and β = 0.1., C = −3.91. Thus, for C ∈ (0, 0.09)
that network is PS, together with CI. Whenever δ = 0.51 and β = 0.5, C = 0.018.
Thus, for C ∈ (0.18, 0.249) that network is PS, together with CI.
A A∗
A∗A
B
B
3.2 Welfare
For the purpose of doing a welfare assessment, let the focus being on an utilitarian
perspective. Thus, the value of a network g is the sum of individual utilities, formally
v(g) =
∑
i ui. A network g is said to be socially preferable to a network g
′ when
the sum of individual utilities is higher for g than for g′, that is, when v(g) > v(g′).
A network g is said to be the most socially preferable when the sum of individuals
utilities for g is at least at high as the sum of individual utilities of any other network
g′, that is, when v(g) ≥ v(g′), for all possible networks g′ that can be formed.
Proposition 4. Let CI be PS, then it is socially preferable to CS. Further:
1. Let nA = nB or nA − 1 = nB. Then CI is the unique most socially preferable.
2. Let nA − 1 > nB and:
(a) C ≥ 2−1(δ + β) − δ2. Then CI is not the most socially preferable. In
particular, all SI yield the same value, are PS the most socially preferable.
(b) C < C < 2−1(δ + β) − δ2. Then the following situations may arise: (i)
CI and SI are equally socially preferable in which case they are the most
socially preferable, (ii) CI is socially preferable to SI, in which case CI is
the most socially preferable and (iii) SI is socially preferable to CI, in which
case they are the most socially preferable (and also PS).
(c) C ≤ C < 2−1(δ + β)− δ2. Then CI is the unique most socially preferable.
It is important to notice that there is not tension between stability and efficiency,
in the sense that there is always a PS network which is the most socially preferred,
either SI or CI.
When nA = nB or nA − 1 = nB any network that is fully intraconnected is
socially preferred to another network, which is, similar to the former in links between
different types, with the difference that is not fully intraconnected. Departing from
fully intraconnected networks any pair of individuals of different type that are not
connected, gain from doing so. Thus CI is the unique most socially preferable. In
particular when nA−1 = nB notice that when a type B is connected to nA−1 types
A and evaluates whether to connect to an extra A, the type B passes from majority
to minority. For this link to be profitable C has to be below a certain threshold,
which is, specifically the one that guarantees that CI is PS (see Proposition 2). That
is addressed in point 1.
When nA − 1 > nB and types B links to types A beyond nA − 1 more than one
individual of type A is involved in the pass from majority to minority. That opens
the possibility that other networks are preferred to CI, since types B might be losing
a lot from these extra connections. That is addressed in point 2.
The following example illustrates the relation between CI and the network in
example 2 for nA − 1 > nB, point 2. Also the case in which nA − 1 = nB, point 1.
Example 4. Let nA = 4, nA∗ = nB = 2, δ = 0.9 and β = 0.1. The value of
CI is nA(nA − 1)(δ − c) + nAnB(δ − C) + nB(nB − 1)(β − c) + nBnA(β − C) =
12(0.9− c) + 8(0.9− C) + 2(0.1− c) + 8(0.1− C). The value of SI in example 3 is
nA(nA−1)(δ−c)+nB(nB−1)(δ−c)+2nBnA∗(δ−C)+2(nA−nA∗)nBδ2 = 12(0.9−
c)+4(0.9−C)+4(0.9)2+2(0.9−c)+4(0.9−C)+4(0.9)2. The difference between the
values of SI and CI is 8(0.9)2 + 2(0.9− c)− 2(0.1− c)− 8(0.1−C) = 7.28 + 8C > 0.
For C ∈ (0, 0.09), the CI network is PS but not the most socially preferred. Consider
now, that nA = 3 and nA∗ = nB = 2, so that, nA − 1 = nB, δ = 0.9. As CI is
PS, C ≤ (n − 1)(β − δ) + δ − δ2 holds (Proposition 2). Notice that in this case
β > (4/5)0.9 + 0.81/5 = 0.882 for the upper bound on C to be strictly positive. Let
β = 0.89. The value of CI is 6(0.9 − c) + 6(0.9 − C) + 2(0.89 − c) + 6(0.89 − C).
The value of a fully intraconnected network in which, further, each B is connected
to n∗A = 2 is 6(0.9− c) + 4(0.9−C) + 2(0.9)2 + 2(0.9− c) + 4(0.9−C) + 2(0.9)2. The
difference between the value of the last network and the value of the CI is 4C−0.28.
CI is not the most socially preferable when PS if C > 0.07. However for CI to be
PS, C ≤ 0.05. Both conditions are incompatible. Thus the alternative network is
not socially preferred to CI. The reason is that CI is PS when types B do not suffer
a great loss by being in minority, i.e., when β is sufficiently close to δ.
When CS is PS it might not be the most socially preferred, due to the positive
externalities that links generate. However, CS is socially preferable to CI due to the
high linking costs between different type individuals. The results are summarized
below.
Proposition 5. Let CS be PS, then it is socially preferred to CI. Further, if cost of
linking with individuals of different types are not so high, CS is not the most socially
preferred. In particular, a network that results from CS by adding a link between
two individuals of different type yields higher value.
For sufficiently low costs of interacting with individuals of different type, the pos-
itive externalities that this links generates on the unconnected individuals overcome
the cost borne by the connected individuals.7 The next example illustrates it:
Example 5. CS is PS but not the most socially preferable.
A B
BA
v(g1) < v(g2)
A* B*
BA
v(g2) > v(g3)
A B
BA
A B
BA
v(g3) > v(g4)
A B
BA
v(g4) > v(g5)
A B
BA
In comparing these networks, the common part due to same type links, 4(δ−c), is
omitted. Thus, v(g1) = 0, v(g2) = 2(δ−C)+4δ2+2δ3. For C ∈ (δ+δ2, δ+2δ2+δ3)
then v(g2) > v(g1). Moreover, v(g3) = 4(δ − C) + 4δ2, v(g4) = 6(δ − C) + 2δ2,
v(g5) = 8(δ − C). Since C > δ, then v(g3) > v(g4) > v(g5).8 The network in which
there is one link connecting the two communities, that is, the bridge network, is the
most socially preferable. The increase in the number of individuals entails however a
difficulty when evaluating which networks are the most socially preferable, due to the
exponential increase in the possible combination of crossed links to be considered.
Since the bridge network yields higher value that CS under the conditions above,
there is an examination of the possible transfers among individuals that make it PS.
Thus, let a transfer rule be a function t : g → Rn such that ∑i ti(g) = 0. It
proposes a redistribution of payoffs within a network g. The analysis is on transfer
rules that make the bridge network PS when nA = nB ≥ 2. The reason is that first,
group size higher than two makes the analysis more general as highlighted below.
Second, making both groups equally represented makes the analysis more neat since
symmetric. The intuition on what happens whenever groups are of different size
is however straightforward. When the group size of individuals of type A is huge,
individuals of type B would potentially be willing to pay more in order to preserve
the link that connect both communities, since they benefit for a higher number of
indirect connections. The result is as follows:
7Specifically, for C ∈ (δ + (nB − 1)δ2, C) with C = δ + (nA − 1)δ2 + (nB − 1)δ2 + (nB − 1)(nA − 1)δ3.
8g2 is still socially preferable to g3 when g3 consists on the same A having two links, one with each with B.
Proposition 6. Let nA = nB ≥ 2. Then there exist transfer rules that make the
bridge network PS. In any of them A∗ and B∗ receive a subsidy for their link. Two
of these rules are:
1. The egalitarian rule, that is, transfers ti for each i such that ui + ti =
∑
i ui
n
.
Under this rule both A∗ and B∗ receive the same subsidy, and the remaining
individuals all pay the same. That is:
(a) tA∗ = tB∗ =
(4− n)(nB − 1)δ2 + (n− 2)(C − δ) + 2(nB − 1)2δ3
n
> 0.
(b) tA = tB =
(4(nB − 1)− n)δ2 + 2(δ − C)− 2(nB − 1)δ3
n
< 0.
2. Under certain conditions on C and c, the transfer rule that leaves A∗ and B∗
indifferent between forming or not their link. That is tA∗ = tB∗ = C−δ−(nB−
1)δ2 > 0. Among the several options to pay the overall subsidy of 2tA∗, the re-
maining individuals may all pay the same, that is, ti =
2(δ + (nB − 1)δ2 − C)
n− 2 <
0 for every i 6= A∗, B∗ or each i 6= A∗, B∗ may pay ti ∈ [0, C − δ− (nB − 1)δ2].
The egalitarian rule compensates A∗ and B∗ for the positive externalities they
generate with their link and the cost they incur when linking, net of the utility
of indirect connections of distance two they already derive from that link. That
is, due to that crossed link, there are distance three connections that benefit the
remaining individuals. In particular, nA − 1 individuals benefit from distance three
connections with others nB − 1 individuals and vice versa. There are two out of
n individuals responsible for that crossed link and hence compensated. Moreover,
A∗ and B∗ incur in a cost C − δ each for that link. This amount is paid by the
remaining n − 2 individuals. The total utility out of distances two is 4(nB − 1)δ2
and A∗ and B∗ already get from (nB − 1)δ2 each, that should be discounted in
the transfer. Notice that when nA = nB = 2, tA∗ = tB∗ = 2
−1(C − δ + δ3) > 0
and tA = tB = 2
−1(δ − δ3 − C) < 0. With respect to the second transfer rule.
Consider that one individual chosen uniformly at random in her group subsidizes
the individual of her own type for the crossed link. In this case individuals are
ex-ante indifferent between the transfer rule in which each pays for sure the same,
and a lottery in which each is chosen uniformly at random within her group, that
is, with probability (nB − 1)−1, to subsidize her type, given that nB = n/2. The
reason as to why the transfer rule according to which types A or B pay exactly
the positive externalities they benefit from does not make the bridge network PS is
because, those individuals might instead break the link with either A∗ or B∗ and
benefit form distance four with the remaining individuals of different types, specially
when the group size of these individuals is high enough. Notice that this does not
happen when n = 4 because a disconnected individuals gets zero utility.9
Regarding the relation between inequality and transfers, it is direct that the dis-
tribution of utilities after the egalitarian transfer rule Lorenz dominates any other
distribution of utilities resulting according to any other transfer rule, and in par-
ticular the one described in point 2 in the above result.10 Regarding the transfer
system describe in point 2 of Proposition 6 the remark is as follows:
Remark. Consider that transfers leave A∗ and B∗ indifferent between forming or
not their link. The distribution of the utilities when the remaining individuals all pay
the same to subsidize that link Lorenz dominates any other distribution of utilities
in which not all of the individuals all pay the same.
First, notice that A∗ and B∗ get (nA − 1)(δ − c) each in any distribution. When
all the remaining individuals all pay the same, (nA − 1)(δ − c) is the lowest utility.
Specifically, the distribution of utilities after transfers looks like (nA−1)(δ−c), (nA−
1)(δ − c), u..., u where:
u = (nA−1)(δ−c)+δ2+δ3(nA−1)− 2
n− 2(C−δ−δ
2(nA−1)) > (nA−1)(δ−c).
The contrary implies that C > δ+(nA−1)δ2+(nB−1)δ2+2(nB−1)(nA−1)δ2, which
contradicts the upper bound on C when the bridge network is socially preferable to
CS (see proposition 5). When not all of the remaining individuals pay the same,
two cases may arise. The first one is when the lowest utility, u′, of individuals
who pay more than in the distribution in which all pay the same, is still higher
than (nA − 1)(δ − c). The distribution of utilities after transfers is: (nA − 1)(δ −
c), (nA − 1)(δ − c), u′, ..., u, ..., u′′ where u′′ > u > u′ > (nA − 1)(δ − c). When not
all individuals pay the same, any partial sum of utilities up to the individuals with
utility up to u is strictly smaller in this distribution than the corresponding sum
in the distribution in which all pay the same. The same hold for any partial sum
including individuals such that u′′ > u. As the subsidy is constant, the magnitude
of the utility loss at the bottom of the distribution always overcomes the utility
gain of the partial sum. Both partial sums are equal only when all individuals are
considered. The second case is when for (some of) those individuals that pay more,
its utility is below (nA−1)(δ−c).11 The distribution is: u′, ..., (nA−1)(δ−c), (nA−
1)(δ − c), u′′, ..., u, ..., u′′′ where u′ < (nA − 1)(δ − c), (nA − 1)(δ − c) < u′′ < u and
u′′′ > u. The argument is parallel than above.
9See Appendix 2.
10The criterion of Lorenz dominance establishes that, given two distributions x = (x1, ..., xn) and y = (y1, ..., yn)
with
∑n
i=1 xi =
∑n
i=1 yi, x Lorenz dominates y if for each m = 1...n,
∑m
i=1 xi ≥
∑m
i=1 yi holds.
11That is the case when two individuals pay C − δ− δ2(nB − 1) each. Then her utility falls below (nA− 1)(δ− c)
when C > δ + δ2(nB − 1) + δ3(nB − 1) + δ2.
3.3 Network structure and segregation
As De Mart´ı and Zenou [2017] point out, one interesting question is how the network
structure emerging in equilibrium induces segregation. This paper uses the Spectral
Segregation Index by Echenique and Fryer [2007] to measure segregation in the
resulting equilibrium networks. This index measures segregation of a group based
on the intensity of the interactions only among the members of that group. Hence
the main ingredient is the intensity of interactions of every pair of connected group
members. In order to recover this ingredient from the model, let di be the degree of
individual i in an equilibrium network, including herself w.l.o.g. For the computation
of the index the assumption is that the intensity of interactions is inversely related
to the the degree. In particular, the intensity of interactions of an individual with
each of her friends is 1/di. Thus an individual with 5 friends pays 1/6 of attention to
each of them. Let dA→B the degree distribution of types A when considering only
their connections to types B. Let SSIi, i = {A,B} be the Spectral Segregation
Index of group i.
Proposition 7. Consider the class of networks in Proposition 3, point 1. Then:
1. When the same nB types A are connected to types B, SSI
A =
nB
n
+
nA − nB
nA
and that is the maximum value the index takes. Minimize SSIA is equivalent
to minimize the variance of dA→B.
2. SSIB =
1
2
.
Consider the class of networks in Proposition 3, point 2. Then:
1. Minimize SSIA is also equivalent to minimize the variance of dA→B.
2. Let nA ≥ n2B. Then SSIA is higher for networks in point 1 than for networks
of point 2.
3. Let nA < n
2
B. Consider the class of networks in Proposition 3, point 2, where
each of the n˜B < nB types B connects to all A and the remaining nB−n˜B types
each connects to the nB types A. When each of the nB − n˜B types connects to
the same types A in networks in point 2 than in networks in point 1, the index
is lower in the former class of networks than in the latter.
4. SSIB is higher for networks in point 1 than for networks in point 2.
The next example illustrates points 3 and 4.
Example. Let nA < n
2
B and consider the following two networks:
A A
AA
B
B
A A
A
A
B
B
For the network in the left (prop 3.1), SSIA =
nB
n
+
nA − nB
nA
=
2
6
+
2
4
= 0.83 and
SSIB = 0.5. For the network on the right (prop 3.2). SSIA = 0.73. Observe that
there is one B in this network connected to the same types than its corresponding
B in the network on the left. Further SSIB = 0.42. In general, if the remaining
types does not behave in the same way in both networks, that result does not hold.
For networks in prop 3.1 SSIA =
n2B − znA
nA + z + 1
+
nA − n2B − znA
nA + z
where z ≥ 1 is the
integer such that znA ≤ n2B and (z + 1)nA ≥ n2B is the minimal value of the index.
For networks in prop 3.2, SSI
A
=
nB
nA + nB
+
nA − nB
nA − 1 is the maximal value of the
index. Let nA = 21 and nB = 19. Thus z = 17. In this case SSI
A = 0.55 and
SSI
A
= 0.57. Let nA = 5 and nB = 3. Thus z = 2. In this case SSI
A = 0.73 and
SSI
A
= 0.71.
Finally, in the CI network SSIi = ni/(ni + nj) where i, j = {A,B} and i 6= j.
In the CS network the index is 1 for A and B.
Notice that here an interesting point arises, which is to notice that there is no
a one to one mapping between welfare, when measured as the sum of individual
utilities, and segregation. The class of networks in Proposition 3, point 1, all have
the same value, however different levels segregation. In a nutshell more segregation
does not have to imply less welfare in our model. the driving mechanism behind
this result is the trade off between the number of relations at the cost of being in
minority. As Echenique et al. [2006] illustrate in their study of the effects of within
school segregation in the U.S., blacks that are more segregated have lower test
scores, but also are less likely to smoke, a widespread behavior among whites. More
segregated Asians also have lower test scores but report to be happier at school. The
authors conclude that while it is well documented that segregation across schools
exacerbates differences in achievements, segregation within schools does not have an
important effect on grades or social behavior.
4 Discussion
Redefining neighbors. Up to now the assumption was that individuals only
care about distance one connections when evaluating whether their own type is
above a given threshold. A more general setting considers individuals consider as
neighborhoods also those at higher distances. Let pd(i,j) be proportion own type in
individual i neighborhood when the neighborhood is defined as connections up to
distance d(i, j). The utility of individual i net of costs is:
ui(g) =
∑
j∈g
(1δ + (1− 1)β)d(i,j)
where 1 is the indicator of whether pd(i,j) ≥ 0.5. Notice that this utility implies
that if when jumping from distance n to distance n+1 own types goes from majority
to minority (or vice versa), only the utility form indirect connections at at distance
between n and n+ 1 are affected. The next example illustrates it:
Example 6. In the following network uB∗ = 2δ − c − C + 2δ2 using the model
in the main body while uB∗ = 2δ − c − C + 2β2 using the extended version. The
reason is that B types represents one half of the neighborhood when that is defined
at distance one only. At distance two B types represent two fifths of the population.
A B∗
BA
A
Individuals now care about being in majority also at higher distances, hence
different types at higher distances as considered as neighbors and thus the utility
goes down. Intuitively, conditions for segregation are easier to meet in this case as
the following remark points out.
Remark. CS is PS iff c ≤ δ − δ2 and C ≥ min{δ + δ2(nB − 1), δ + β2(nA − 1)}.
When nA = nB any individual’s type is represented with one half in the distance
two case, when establishing a link. Hence that individuals evaluates its utility with
δ in both cases. That is the first part within the min operator. However when
nA > nB and a type B establishes a link, she is in minority when her neighborhood
is defined as those individuals up to distance two. That is why she evaluates type
A links with β. For type A there is no change since she is in majority anyway. For,
at least, the same range of C complete segregation is PS, i.e., individuals become
more segregationist. This new specification does not affect the decision of breaking
links with same type individuals.
Multiplicity of equilibria. Consider that nA − 1 > nB. One might think
which network to expect as a function of the starting point. The notion of improving
paths introduced by Jackson and Watts [2002] might help to make these predictions.
That is, starting at a given network which networks we could expect to emerge
in equilibrium through a sequence of networks with the following characteristics:
every network differs from the previous one just by adding or deleting a single link.
The notion of improving paths captures this feature of the dynamic process. An
improving path is sequence of networks that emerge when individuals form or sever
links based on the improvement the resulting network offers relative to the current
network. In order for a link to be deleted, the individual making the decision
must gain with the decision and does not need the consent of the other individual
involved. If a network arises from the previous one by adding a link, both individuals
involved should benefit from it.12 Consider as a starting point a fully intraconnected
network in which, further, each B is connected to n˜A < nB types A. In this case,
Since c < C ≤ min{δ − δ2, β − β2} the first individual in the sequence will never
delete a link with same types, and in fact, this is true at any point in time. Thus, in
any adjacent network to the starting point any individual must be willing to form
a link. In particular consider that B form a link with A. In this case type A gains
since she is in majority always and B also gain given the bounds on C. One can
consider a sequence of adjacent networks in which types B, one in a row complete
all the links with types A, up to the point in which every type B is connected to
exactly nB types A. In this way, the network in proposition 3, point 1, arises, which
is PS under some restrictions in c and C. Any PS network is not, by definition, in
the improving path of any other network, thus the process stops.
Consider as a starting point a fully intraconnected networks in which, further,
each B is connected to n˜A ∈ (nB, nA) types A. Since C ≤ min{δ − δ2, β − β2}
the first individual in the sequence will never delete same type links. That is true
at any point in time. In any adjacent network to the starting point any individual
must be willing to form a link with different types. In particular considers that B
forms a link with A. A type A gains since she is in majority always. A Type B also
gains given the bounds on C. One can consider a sequence of adjacent networks in
which types B, one in a row complete all the links with types A, up to the point in
which every type B is connected to all types A. The CI network arises as a product
of this process, which stops there. Notice than in this case the minority group B is
willing to establish relations with members of the majority group. As Cheng and
Yamamura [1957] points out group size is a factor affecting assimilation of minority
groups. That is members of the minority group are willing to engage in marriage
with members of the majority group in other to assimilate to the majority culture.
5 Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. Let nA = nB and focus on type A w.l.o.g.
CI. Notice that (NsA + 1)/(NA + 1) = nA/n = 0.5. If a type A is deciding to
12Notice that the notion of improving path inherits the properties of pairwise stability. It is also a myopic concept
in the sense that individuals do not evaluate the consequences that their actions may have on others’ choices.
break a link with another type A the fraction of own type in her neighborhood
can be written as NsA/NA. Notice that N
s
A/NA ≥ (NsA + 1)/(NA + 1) implies that
NsA ≥ NA which is a contradiction, since the number of same type friends is strictly
smaller than the total number of friends. Hence NsA/NA < 0.5. Thus links in CI
worth δ while links if type A severs a link with another type A links worth β < δ.
A type A does not sever a link with another A if:
(n− 1)δ − nBC − (nA − 1)c︸ ︷︷ ︸
uA(g)
≥ (n− 2)β + β2 − nBC − (nA − 2)c︸ ︷︷ ︸
uA(g−AA)
or
c ≤ (δ − β)(n− 1) + β − β2. (1)
When type A evaluates breaking a link with type B, (NsA + 1)/NA > 0.5. Thus,
links worth δ before and after breaking that link. Thus, a A does not sever a link
with B if:
(n− 1)δ − nBC − (nA − 1)c︸ ︷︷ ︸
uA(g)
≥ (n− 2)δ + δ2 − (nB − 1)C − (nA − 1)c︸ ︷︷ ︸
uA(g−AB)
or
C ≤ δ − δ2. (2)
Notice that RHS of (2) < RHS of (1). The contrary would imply that β2 − δ2 ≥
(δ − β)(n − 1) + β − δ, which is a contradiction since the LHS of this equation is
negative while its RHS is positive. As c < C only condition (2) matters.
CS. Notice that (NsA+1)/(NA+1) = 1. Regardless of whether a type A is deciding
to break a link with another type A the fraction of own type in her neighborhood
is still 1, so links always worth δ. A type A does not sever a link with another type
A if:
(nA − 1)(δ − c)︸ ︷︷ ︸
uA(g)
≥ (nA − 2)(δ − c) + δ2︸ ︷︷ ︸
uA(g−AA)
or
c ≤ δ − δ2. (3)
When type A evaluates forming a link with type B, the new fraction of own types
can be written as (NsA + 1)/(NA + 2), which is at least 0.5. To see so notice that
(NsA+1)/(NA+2) < 0.5 implies that N
s
A < 0.5NA. That can only hold when N
s
A = 0
which in turn implies that nA = nB = 1 and hence n = 2, but by assumption n > 2.
Thus, links always worth δ. Therefore, a type A does not form a link with a type B
if:
(nA − 1)(δ − c)︸ ︷︷ ︸
uA(g)
> (nA − 1)(δ − c) + δ + δ2(nB − 1)− C︸ ︷︷ ︸
uA(g+AB)
or
C > δ + δ2(nB − 1). (4)
Conditions (3) and (4) characterize CS. Finally set nB = n/2.

Proof of Proposition 2. Let nA > nB.
CI. First, consider types A. If a type A breaks a link with another type A the new
fraction of own type in her neighborhood can be written as NsA/NA or equivalently
(nA − 1)/(n − 1). Notice that (nA − 1)/(n − 1) < 0.5 implies that nA − 1 < nB,
which is a contradiction since nA > nB implies that nA−1 ≥ nB. Thus, links before
and after breaking this worth δ. A type A does not sever a link with another type
A if:
(n− 1)δ − (nA − 1)c− nBC︸ ︷︷ ︸
uA(g)
≥ (n− 2)δ + δ2 − (nA − 2)c− nBC︸ ︷︷ ︸
uA(g−AA)
or
c ≤ δ − δ2. (5)
When type A evaluates breaking a link with type B, the new fraction of own
types can be written as (NsA+1)/NA > 0.5. Links worth δ before and after breaking
the link. Thus, A does not sever a link with B if:
(n− 1)δ − (nA − 1)c− nBC︸ ︷︷ ︸
uA(g)
≥ (n− 2)δ + δ2 − (nA − 1)c− (nB − 1)C︸ ︷︷ ︸
uA(g−AB)
or
C ≤ δ − δ2. (6)
Since c < C, condition (6) is the most restrictive.
Second, consider types B. If a type B breaks a link with another type B the
fraction of own type in her neighborhood can be written as NsB/NB < 0.5. So links
before and after breaking the link worth β. Analogous calculations than those to
get (5) lead to:
c ≤ β − β2. (7)
If a type B breaks a link with a type A the fraction of own type in her neigh-
borhood can be written as (NsB + 1)/NB or equivalently nB/(n − 1). Notice also
that nB/(n − 1) ≤ 0.5. The contrary would imply that nB > nA − 1 which is a
contradiction since nA > nB implies that nA − 1 ≥ nB. There are two cases: if
nA− 1 > nB then (NsB + 1)/NB < 0.5. Analogous calculations than those to get (6)
lead to:
C ≤ β − β2. (8)
If nB = nA − 1 then (NsB + 1)/NB = 0.5. Links before and after worth β and δ,
respectively. Thus , a type B does not sever a link with a type A if:
(n− 1)β − nAC − (nB − 1)c︸ ︷︷ ︸
uB(g)
≥ (n− 2)δ + δ2 − (nA − 1)C − (nB − 1)c︸ ︷︷ ︸
uB(g−BA)
or
C ≤ (n− 1)(β − δ) + δ − δ2. (9)
.
Under nA−1 > nB conditions are (5)−(8). Since c < C, (6) and (8) are the most
restrictive. Combining the two yields C ≤ min{δ− δ2, β−β2}. Under nA− 1 = nB
conditions are (5)−(7) and (9). Let β > (n−2)δ/(n−1)+(n−1)−1δ2 for the LHS of
(9) to be strictly positive. Notice that (n−1)(β− δ)+ δ− δ2 < i− i2, i = δ, β. That
is direct for i = δ. For i = β the contrary implies that β2−δ2 ≥ (δ−β)(n−1)+β−δ
which is a contradiction. Hence, condition (9) is the one that matters.
CS. First, consider type A. The analysis is analogous to the one in Proposition
1. A type A does not sever a link with another type A if condition (3) holds and
does not form a link with a type B if condition (4) holds. Second, consider types B.
The reasoning is the same but condition (4) modifies to:
C > δ + δ2(nA − 1). (10)
Condition (3) has to be satisfied for same types being completely connected.
Since nA > nB, RHS of (10) > RHS of (4). Since link formation is mutual consent,
no link between A and B is formed if and only if (4) holds. 
Proof of Proposition 3. Let CS be PS. Thus, c ≤ δ − δ2 and C > δ + δ2(nB − 1).
The claim is that a network with links between different types cannot be PS. The
argument is that, in particular, types A always want to break those links. Notice
that, first, whenever a type A is in majority, by severing a link with B, A remains
so. The worst case scenario for A is when she loses a lot by breaking that link
with B. That happens when: (i) A is breaking the only link she has to types B,
(ii) no other types A have links to B and (iii) that B with whom A is breaking,
has direct connections to all the remaining nB − 1 types B, that are all directly
connected among themselves. Thus A is losing a direct connection that does not
become of higher order (i.e., it disappears). Also, A is entirely losing all indirect
nB − 1 connections of order 2. The change in utility is −δ + C − (nB − 1)δ2.
Severing that link is profitable if C > δ + δ2(nB − 1). Exactly as prescribed by
the conditions for CS to be PS.13 Second, let A go from minority to majority when
severing the link. The worst case scenario for severing a link with B arises in the
13The case in which A is in minority and remains so after severing a link, is analogous just changing δ for β. Thus
C > β + β2(nB − 1) also holds.
same situation as above. In this case A is entirely losing the utility of one direct
connection and nB − 1 connections of order 2. She further gains, δn − βn for
unchanged indirect connections, denoted u, of order n ≥ 2. In short, the change in
utility is −β+C − (nB − 1)β2 +
∑u
j=1(δ
d(i,j)− βd(i,j)). Severing a link is profitable
whenever C > β + (nB − 1)β2 −
∑u
j=1(δ
d(i,j) − βd(i,j)), which is implied by the
conditions for CS to be PS. Thus no network with links between different types is
PS. Finally, since c ≤ δ−δ2 < δ−δn non-connected similar types, gain when linking.
Thus only CS is PS.
Let CI be PS and nA = nB. Thus c < C ≤ δ − δ2. Let nA = nB > 2. The
bipartite network is PS iff C ≤ β−β3 and c > β−β2.14 Let β−β3 < δ−δ2 and c <
C ∈ (β−β2, β−β3), both the bipartite network and CI are PS. Let CI be PS and nA−
1 > nB. Thus c < C ≤ min{δ−δ2, β−β2}. Any PS network is fully intraconnected.
When two individuals of same type form a link they remain in (i) minority and gain
−c+ β− βn each (ii) majority and gain −c+ δ− δn each or (iii) pass from minority
to majority and gain −c+ δ−βn each. From each of the existing direct connections
the gain is δ−β. The same happens for the remaining indirect connections with the
appropriate powers of δ and β. Further, this link can only reduce length of indirect
connections. In every case links with similar types increase utility. Thus consider
fully intraconnected networks. Focus on links between different types. A type A
always accepts connections with types B since −C+δ−δ2 ≥ 0. A network in which
each B is connected to n˜A ∈ (nB, nA) types A is not PS since −C + β − β2 ≥ 0.
Thus, B also gains from an extra link with A. A network in which each B is
connected to n˜A < nB types A is not PS since a type B gets −C + δ − δ2 ≥ 0
from a extra link with A, when by doing so it remains in majority. For a network in
which every B connects to exactly nA∗ = nB types A to be PS the conditions are:
B does not link to type A 6= A∗ if (nB − 1)(δ − c) + nA∗(δ − C) + (nA − nA∗)δ2︸ ︷︷ ︸
uB(g)
>
(nB − 1)(β − c) + (nA∗ + 1)(β − C) + (nA − nA∗ − 1)β2︸ ︷︷ ︸
uB(g+BA)
or
C > nA∗(β − δ) + (nA − nA∗)(β2 − δ2) + β − β2 + (nB − 1)(β − δ). (11)
A∗ does not break with B and vice versa if
C ≤ δ − δ2. (12)
Notice that the RHS of (11)< min{δ − δ2, β − β2}. Hence under
c < C ∈ (n∗A(β − δ) + (nA − n∗A)(β2 − δ2) + β − β2,min{δ − δ2, β − β2}), (13)
14The bipartite network is one in which each individual of a given type is connected to all individuals of different
type and there no other connections.
networks in this class are PS. A network in which some types B are connected
to n˜A ∈ (nB,nA) types A and other types B are connected to n˜A < nB types A
is not PS. By the same reasoning as above, types B connected to n˜A ∈ (nB,nA)
types A not connected A and B want to form links by the same reasoning as above.
Types B connected to n˜A < nB want to form new links with types A up to nB for
sure. Consider the network in which some B are connected all A and others B to
exactly nB types A. In this network a link between A and B is not severed since
C ≤ min{δ − δ2, β − β2}. Types B connected to nB types A do not form a link
with other A if (11) holds. Thus, (13) guarantees that networks in this class are PS.
Let CI be PS and nA − 1 = nB. Thus C ≤ (n− 1)(β − δ) + δ − δ2. Notice that
(n − 1)(β − δ) + δ − δ2 ≤ i − i2, i = {δ, β}. That is direct when i = δ. When
i = β the contrary would imply that (n − 1)(β − δ) + δ − β ≥ δ2 − β2, which is a
contradiction. Thus, by the same reasoning as above only the PS networks above
can be PS also in this case. However, the networks in which (some) types B connect
to nB types A is not PS. Since n
∗
A = nA − 1, (11) becomes:
C > (n− 1)(β − δ) + δ − δ2. (14)
That contradicts the condition for CI to be PS. Thus B wants to form a link with
A 6= A∗, who accepts. Thus, only CI is PS. 
Proof of Proposition 4. Let nA = nB or nA − 1 = nB. The proof goes as follows:
first, it is shown that any network is less socially preferable than a counterpart
network which have the same crossed links as the first and is also fully intracon-
nected. Second, it is shown that departing from the fully intraconnected network
all individuals gain by completing links with different types, hence CI is the unique
most socially preferable.15 Let nA = nB and focus on type A w.l.o.g. Let n˜A
and n˜B the number of types A and B to whom a type A is linked, respectively.
The ratio of own type in her neighborhood when she is connected to all types A
is nA/(nA + n˜B) ≥ 0.5, hence links worth δ. The ratio of own type in her neigh-
borhood in any other case is (n˜A + 1)/(n˜A + n˜B + 1). This ratio can be smaller,
equal of higher than one half. First, let (n˜A + 1)/(n˜A + n˜B + 1) < 0.5. Then links
worth β. Let ∆uA be a lower bound for the change in utility when a type A goes
from not being connected to all A to be connected to all of them. Thus ∆uA =
(δ−β)n˜A+(δ−β)n˜B +(nA−1− n˜A)(δ−c)− (nA−1− n˜A)β2+(nB− n˜B)(δn−βn)
where (δ − β)n˜A and (δ − β)n˜B are the changes in utility of existing connections,
(nA − 1 − n˜A)(δ − c) is the utility of new connections with same type individuals,
(nA−1− n˜A)β2 is the highest lost related to indirect connections with types A that
have become direct, since those individuals could have been at distance more than
15In contrast to Jackson and Wolinsky [1996], it is not true that individuals always gain from forming links, so
their proof does not hold here.
two. Finally, (nB − n˜B)(δn − βn) is the change in utility of indirect connections
to types B at distance n ≥ 2. That is the smallest gain because through con-
nections to A, indirect distances could also be potentially reduced. Since CI is PS,
c ≤ δ−δ2 < δ−β2. Hence ∆uA > 0. Second, let (n˜A+1)/(n˜A+n˜B+1) ≥ 0.5. Then
in both cases links worth δ and ∆uA = (nA− 1− n˜A)(δ− c)− (nA− 1− n˜A)δn ≥ 0
with n ≥ 2, since c ≤ δ − δ2. There is also some positive value due to indi-
rect distances with individuals of different types potentially reduced. Thus, fully
intraconnected networks are socially preferable to their counterparts. Once a net-
work is fully intraconnected two individuals of different types always gain when
forming a link with a different type since C ≤ δ − δ2. Thus, CI is the unique
most socially preferable. Let nA − 1 = nB. The proof for types A is the same
as above. For types B, the ratio of own type in her neighborhood when she is
connected to everyone of own type is nB/(nB + n˜A) which can be higher, equal
of smaller than one half. Let nB/(nB + n˜A) ≥ 0.5, the proof is the same than
above, thus fully intraconnected networks are socially preferable to their coun-
terparts. With respect to crossed links, since C ≤ δ − δ2 types A gain when
linking to B. Since nB/(nB + nA) < 0.5 for any B, the value of links pass
from δ to β when linking to the last A. Hence for B to gain with this link
(nB − 1)(β − δ) + (nA − 1)(β − δ) + β −C − δ2 ≥ 0 has to hold. That is equivalent
to C ≤ (n − 1)(β − δ) + δ − δ2, which precisely guarantees that CI is PS. Hence
the CI network is the uniquely most socially preferable. Let nB/(nB + n˜A) < 0.5.
Notice that n˜B + 1 ≤ nB. Which implies that (n˜B + 1)/(n˜A + n˜B + 1) < 0.5. Hence
links before and after, completing all the connections with other types B, worth
β. Thus ∆uB = (nB − 1 − n˜B)(β − c) − (nB − 1 − n˜B)βn, with ≥ 2. There is
also some positive value due to indirect distances with individuals of different types
potentially reduced. Recall that c ≤ C ≤ (n− 1)(β− δ) + δ− δ2 for the CI network
to be PS. It is direct that (n− 1)(β − δ) + δ − δ2 < β − β2. Thus, ∆uB > 0. With
respect to crossed links individuals of both types gain by the same arguments as
above. Hence CI is the unique most socially preferable. Let nA − 1 > nB. Thus,
C ≤ min{δ− δ2, β−β2} for CI to be PS. Thus, any pair of non-connected individu-
als of same type gain by linking. Focus then on fully intraconnected networks. The
value of CI is:
nA(nA − 1)(δ − c) + nAnB(δ − C) + nB(nB − 1)(β − c) + nBnA(β − C). (15)
Consider networks in Proposition 3, point 1. They are fully intraconnected and
further each type B is connected to nA∗ = nB types A. First notice that regardless
of which types A each B is connected to, all these networks yield the same value. To
see that notice that the value of same type links is the same in all these networks.
Regarding crossed links, for types B the value is also the same since each B is
connected to the same number of types A. For types A notice that any network of
this class can be reached by modifying one link at a time on the network in which
all B are connected to the same types A. In each one link deviation, only utilities
of the two types A involved change by the amount δ − δ2 and opposite sign. Thus,
w.l.o.g, let each B links to the same types A. The value of this network is:
nA(nA− 1)(δ− c) + 2nA∗nB(δ−C) + 2(nA− nA∗)nBδ2 + nB(nB − 1)(δ− c). (16)
Using nA∗ = nB and after some algebra, (16) - (15) can be written as:
nB[(nB−nA)(δ−C)+2(nA−nB)δ2+(nB−1)(δ−β)+nB(δ−C)−nA(β−C)] (17)
or equivalently
nB[−nA(δ − 2δ2 + β − 2C) + nB(2δ − 2δ2 − 2C) + (nB − 1)(δ − β)] (18)
Recall that C ≤ min{δ− δ2, β−β2} for CI to be PS. Then C ≥ 2−1(δ+β− 2δ2)
suffices for (18) ≥ 0 and thus CI is not the most socially preferable. Recall that
the focus is on fully intraconnected networks: since C ≤ min{δ − δ2, β − β2} types
A always gain when linking to types B. Each B also gains when linking up to nB
types A. When B connects to more than nB types A, the claim is that any type B
loses more than the gain of types A. The utility of B with nB links to types A is:
(nB − 1)(δ − c) + nB(δ − C) + (nA − nB)δ2. (19)
The utility of B with e ∈ [1, nA − nB] extra links to types A is:
(nB − 1)(β − c) + (nB + e)(β − C) + (nA − nB − e)β2. (20)
Thus, (20)− (19) ≥ 0 for:
C ≤ (2nB − 1)(β − δ) + (nA − nB)(β
2 − δ2)
e
+ β − β2. (21)
Since β−δ < 0, the RHS of (21) is the highest whenever nB = 1 and e = nA−nB.
In that case C is bounded above by β − δ2 < 2−1(δ + β) − δ2 as nA → ∞. Then
C ≥ 2−1(δ + β)− δ2. and (21) are incompatible, meaning that any type B is worse
off when connecting to extra types A. The gain of types A with e extra links is:
e(δ − δ2 − C). (22)
The absolute value of the loss of type B is:
eC + (2nB − 1)(δ − β) + e(β2 − β) + (nA − nB)(δ2 − β2). (23)
The claim is that (23)− (22) > 0. That is, any type B loses more than the gain
of types A. (23)− (22) is:
2eC + 2(nB − 1)(δ − β) + e(β2 + δ2 − β − δ) + (nA − nB)(δ2 − β2). (24)
Let 2−1(δ + β) − δ2 < 0. Setting C = 0 (as an exteme case) and e = nA − nB
reduces the value of (24), which becomes:
(nB − 1)(δ − β) + nB(δ − β) + (nA − nB)(2δ2 − β − δ). (25)
Since (δ + β) < 2δ2 thus (25) > 0.
Let 2−1(δ + β) − δ2 > 0. Rewrite e = nA − nB − x with x ∈ [0, nA − nB − 1].
Thus (24) becomes:
nB(3δ−β−2δ2−2C)+β−δ+nA(2C+2δ2−β−δ)+x(δ+β−β2−δ2−2C). (26)
Since C ≥ 2−1(δ+β)−δ2 > 0 the term accompanying nA is non-negative. Since,
C ≤ min{β−β2, δ−δ2} direct algebra shows that the terms accompanying x and nB
are both positive. Thus (26) is the smallest whenever x = 0, nB = 1 and nA = 3.
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Thus (26) reduces to:
4C + 4δ2 − 3β − δ, (27)
which is positive since C ≥ 2−1(δ+β)−δ2 > 4−1(δ+3β)−δ2. Thus, the networks
in proposition 3, point 1, are the most socially preferable. These networks are PS
for C ∈ (C,min{δ− δ2, β− β2}), where C = nB(β− δ) + (nA−nB)(β2− δ2) + β−
β2 + (nB − 1)(β − δ) (see expression (13) in the proof of Proposition 3). It turns
out that C < 2−1(δ+ β)− δ2. The contrary implies that (4nB − 1)(β− δ) + 2(nA−
nB − 1)(β2 − δ2) > 0, which is a contradiction. As C > 2−1(δ + β) − δ2. These
networks are PS together with CI.
Consider now that C < 2−1(δ + β) − δ2 and focus on CI, hence x = 0. Hence
the RHS of (21) at x = 0 is C = β − δ2 + (2nB − 1)(β − δ)
nA − nB . Evaluating (26) at
C and x = 0 yields (after some algebra): (n − 1)(β − δ) < 0. Thus every type
B gains when linking to all A, who also gain as argued above. Thus, for C = C,
CI is socially preferred to the networks in proposition 3, point 1. That is also the
case when C < C since (26) is decreasing in C when x = 0. To compare CI with
any other network that form by adding extra links, notice that in this case x > 0.
Hence for C ≤ C the gain that any type B enjoys by connecting to e extra types
A is smaller when e 6= nA − nB ( x > 0) than when e = nA − nB (x = 0).17
Since (26) increases with x, CI is the uniquely most socially preferable. Finally, let
16Recall that the framework is such that nA − 1 > nB .
17That gain may even be a loss.
C ∈ (C, 2−1(δ + β)− δ2). There are values of C, nA and nB, δ and β such that CI
and SI are equally preferred, CI is socially preferred to SI or vice versa. Let CI be
socially preferred to SI. That means that (26) < 0 at x = 0. For any x > 0 (26) is
less negative. Thus CI is the most socially preferred. Let SI be socially preferred to
CI, thus (26) > 0 at x = 0. For any x > 0, (26) is more positive. Thus SI is the
most socially preferred. Let SI be and CI and equally preferred, thus,(26) = 0 at
x = 0. For any x > 0, (26) is more positive. Thus SI and CI are the most socially
preferred. Let CI and SI be equally preferred. That means that (26) = 0. For
any x > 0, (26) become positive. Thus CI and SI are the most socially preferable.
Regarding pairwise stability notice that C > C, hence SI are PS
Regarding the comparison between CI and CS, the value of CS is:
nA(nA − 1)(δ − c) + nB(nB − 1)(δ − c). (28)
The value of CI when nA = nB is:
nA(nA − 1)(δ − c) + nB(nB − 1)(δ − c) + 2nAnB(δ − C). (29)
and when nA > nB is:
nA(nA − 1)(δ − c) + nB(nB − 1)(β − c) + nAnB(δ − C) + nAnB(β − C). (30)
Since C < β < δ, (29) > (28). In comparing (28) and (30), suppose that CS
yields higher value than CI. That is, let (nB − 1)(δ− c) ≥ (nB − 1)(β− c) + nA(δ−
C) + nA(β − C). That implies that:
nA(δ + β − 2C) ≤ (nB − 1)(δ − β) (31)
When nA − 1 > nB then C ≤ (n− 1)(β − δ) + δ − δ2 < i− i2, i = δ, β, for CI to
be PS (see the proof of Proposition 2). Hence the LHS (30)>0 and is the smallest
whenver nA − 2 = nB. That implies that nB ≤ 0, which is a contradiction. Thus
CS cannot yield higher value than CI. When nA − 1 = nB the LHS (30)>0 as well,
and the same contradiction is reached.
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Proof of Proposition 5. Let CS be PS. Thus, C > δ + δ2(nB − 1) and c ≤ δ − δ2.
Denote by gs the network under segregation and gs+AB the network which differs
form the segregated one by adding a link between A and B. Let µ = nA(nA−1)(δ−
c) + nB(nB − 1)(δ − c). Then, v(gs) = µ and V (gs+AB) = µ + 2δ − 2C + (nB −
1)δ2 + (nA − 1)δ2 + (nA − 1)(δ2 + (nB − 1)δ3) + (nB − 1)(δ2 + (nA − 1)δ3). That
v(gs+AB) < v(gs) implies that C > δ+(nB−1)δ2+(nA−1)δ2+(nB−1)(nA−1)δ3.
Hence for C ∈ (δ + (nB − 1)δ2, δ + (nB − 1)δ2 + (nA − 1)δ2 + (nB − 1)(nA − 1)δ3),
this network with and extra link is socially preferable to CS.
Denote by gI the network under complete integration. Then V (gI) = nA(nA −
1)(δ− c) +nB(nB− 1)(δ− c) + 2nAnB(δ−C) when nA = nB and V (gI) = nA(nA−
1)(δ− c) +nB(nB − 1)(β− c) +nAnB(δ−C) +nAnB(β−C) when nA > nB. Since
C > δ, v(gI) < v(gs). Hence CS is socially preferable to CI.

Proof of Proposition 6. Let nA = nB > 2. Consider the bridge network with A
∗
and B∗ being the individuals that bridge the two communities. Denote by A and
B the remaining individuals of either type. Notice that uA∗ = uB∗ = (nA − 1)(δ −
c) + δ − C + (nB − 1)δ2 and uA = uB = (nA − 1)(δ − c) + δ2 + (nB − 1)δ3.18 The
system of transfers that sustains the bridge network as an equilibrium has to satisfy
the following conditions:
(a) A link between A and B does not form whenever uA + tA ≥ uA+AB and/or
uB+tB ≥ uB+BA. For A the expression becomes (nA−1)(δ−c)+δ2+(nB−1)δ3+
tA ≥ (nA−1)(δ−c)+δ−C+(nB−1)δ2. Thus tA ≥ δ−C+(nB−1)(δ2−δ3)−δ2.
Analogously, tB ≥ δ − C + (nA − 1)(δ2 − δ3)− δ2.
(b) A link between A∗ and B does not form whenever uA∗ + tA∗ ≥ uA∗+A∗B and/or
uB + tB ≥ uB+BA∗ . That leads to tA∗ ≥ δ− δ2−C and/or tB ≥ δ−C + (nA−
1)(δ2 − δ3)− δ2.
(c) Analogously, a link between B∗ and A does not form whenever tB∗ ≥ δ− δ2−C
and/or tA ≥ δ − C + (nB − 1)(δ2 − δ3)− δ2.
(d) A∗ and A do not sever their link whenever uA∗ + tA∗ ≥ uA−A∗A and uA + tA ≥
uA−AA∗ . Thus, tA∗ ≥ c− δ + δ2 and tA ≥ c− δ − (nB − 1)(δ3 − δ4) + δ3.
(e) Analogously, B∗ and B do not sever their link whenever tB∗ ≥ c − δ + δ2 and
tB ≥ c− δ − (nA − 1)(δ3 − δ4) + δ3.
(f) A∗ and B∗ does not sever their link whenever uA∗ + tA∗ ≥ uA∗−A∗B∗ and uB∗ +
tB∗ ≥ uB∗−B∗A∗ . Thus, tA∗ ≥ C− δ− (nB − 1)δ2 and tB∗ ≥ C− δ− (nA− 1)δ2
(g) A and A (resp. B and B) do not sever their link if tA ≥ c − δ + δ2 (resp.
tB ≥ c− δ + δ2).
Recall that CS is PS but the bridge network is socially preferable to it. Hence
c ≤ δ−δ2 and C ∈ (δ+(nB−1)δ2, δ+(nB−1)δ2+(nB−1)δ2+(nB−1)(nB−1)δ3).
By (f), tA∗ , tB∗ > 0 . Also, (f) implies the conditions for tA∗ and tB∗ in (b) and (c)
and in (d) and (e).
With respect to tA and tB conditions (d), (e) and (g) have to be satisfied. Re-
garding (a), at least one. The comparison thus concerns c−δ−(nA−1)(δ3−δ4)+δ3,
18For the sake of simplicity the argument in the utility is omitted.
c− δ+ δ2, and δ−C+ (nB− 1)(δ2− δ3)− δ2, the lower bounds for tA and tB in (d),
(e), (g) and (a). Given the conditions on c and C for CS to be PS, these bounds
are negative. Notice that c− δ + δ2 > c− δ − (nA − 1)(δ3 − δ4) + δ3. The contrary
implies that δ2 < δ3 − (nA − 1)(δ3 − δ4), which is a contradiction since δ2 > δ3.
Then (g) implies (d) and (e).
Regarding (g) and (a), the comparison is between c− δ + δ2 and δ − C + (nB −
1)(δ2 − δ3) − δ2. Let c − δ + δ2 ≥ δ − C + (nA − 1)(δ2 − δ3) − δ2. That is, let (g)
imply (a). Hence transfers are of the from tA∗ , tB∗ ≥ C − δ − (nB − 1)δ2 > 0 and
tA, tB ≥ c− δ + δ2 < 0. The inequality above implies that:
C + c ≥ 2(δ − δ2) + (nB − 1)(δ2 − δ3). (32)
Notice that whenever δ− δ2− c ≥ C − δ− (nB − 1)δ2 every individual could pay
2(n − 2)−1(C − δ − (nB − 1)δ2). That would be the transfer system such that A∗
and B∗ each is compensated for the loss due to their link, and everyone else pays
the same amount.The previous inequality implies that:
C + c ≤ 2δ + (nB − 2)δ2. (33)
First notice, that the RHS (31) < RHS (32). The contrary implies that −δ2 > δ3,
which is a contradiction. Thus, both conditions are compatible. Further they have
to be also compatible with the fact that C ∈ (δ+ (nB−1)δ2, δ+ (nB−1)δ2 + (nB−
1)δ2 + (nB − 1)(nB − 1)δ3) by PS of CS.
Notice that (32) establishes an upper bound on C, that is C ≤ 2δ+(nB−2)δ2−c.
This upper bound has to be higher than δ + (nB − 1)δ2, the lower bound on C for
CS to be PS. Since 2δ+ (nB − 2)δ2− c > δ+ (nB − 1)δ2 for c < δ− δ2. There are C
compatible with these requirements. Analogously notice that (31) establishes a lower
bound on C, that is, C ≥ 2(δ−δ2)+(nB−1)(δ2−δ3)−c. This lower bound has to be
smaller than δ+(nB−1)δ2+(nB−1)δ2+(nB−1)(nB−1)δ3, the upper bound on C for
CS to be PS. Thus, 2(δ−δ2)+(nB−1)(δ2−δ3)−c < δ+2(nB−1)δ2+(nB−1)2δ3 or
c > δ−2δ2−δ3−δ2(nB−1)−δ3(nB−1)2. For δ ∈ (0.41, 1) the RHS of this inequality
is negative, so it holds for any c. Summing up the transfer system in which A∗ and
B∗ are exactly compensating for establishing the link, and the remaining agents all
pay the same, makes the bridge networks PS. Notice that any other payment of the
(n-2) individuals such that each pays ti ∈ [0, C − δ − δ2(nB − 1)] also works.
The egalitarian transfer system makes any network PS, since societal and indi-
vidual incentives are aligned, see Jackson [2008] pp 174-175. The computations are
omitted and come from solving the equation ui(g)+t
e
i (g) = n
−1∑n
i=1 ui(g) for every
i, where g is the bridge network. Thus, every individual has to get the same utility,
which is the value of the network, divided by the number of individuals in society.
That is achieved through transfers.
Proof of Proposition 7. SSIA is the largest eigenvalue of the matrix A which de-
scribes interactions only among types A, see Echenique and Fryer [2007]. Let
aij ∈ [0, 1] be a typical entry of A describing the intensity of the relation between i
and j. By theorem 8.1.22 in Horn and Johnson [1990]:
min
1≤j≤n
∑
i
aij ≤ SSIA ≤ max
1≤j≤n
∑
i
aij .
Since aij = 1/di, all columns of A sum up to the same value,
∑nA
i=1(nA + n
i
B)
−1,
where niB is the number of types B a type A is connected to and nA enters due
to full intraconnection.19 Thus SSIA equals that sum. Due to full intraconnection
nA is fixed. Thus the only aspect that alters the index is how links to types B
distribute. The SSIA reacts to this distribution as follows: consider A′ and A with
A′ having more links to B than A. Denote the number of links to B by nB˜ and nBˆ,
for A′ and A, respectively. Thus, nB˜ > nBˆ. By changing one link from A
′ to A the
index always decreases except when A has just one link less than A′, in which case
remains constant. Due that one link change only entries of A′ and A change in any
column of A. For A′, her entry increases from 1/(nA + nB˜) to 1/(nA + nB˜ − 1),
that is, by 1/(nA +nB˜)(nA +nB˜ − 1). For A, her entry decreases from 1/(nA +nBˆ)
to 1/(nA + nBˆ + 1), that is, by 1/(nA + nBˆ)(nA + nBˆ + 1). If nB˜ − 1 ≥ nBˆ + 1,
then the decrement overcomes the increment. Thus, overall the index decreases.
Let nB˜ − 1 < nBˆ + 1 and notice that this only happens whenever nB˜ − nBˆ = 1.
The decrement and the increment are equal and so is the index. Thus whenever a
redistribution in the above sense is possible, it reduces the index. As a consequence
the case in which types A accumulate the highest number of links to B each, makes
the index maximal. The minimum number of types A accumulating nB links each is
nB. Hence, SSI
A =
∑nB
i=1(nA + nB)
−1+
∑nA
i=nB+1
(nA)
−1 = nB/n+ (nA − nB)/nA.
The result above implies that to minimize the index links have to be as evenly
distributed as possible across types A. Otherwise there is always a one link transfers
that reduces the index. The way of achieving that slight varies depending on the
relation between the number of links to be distributed, which is n2B, and the number
of the nA types A receiving these links. Let nA = n
2
B, then the index is minimal
when each A has exactly one link. The variance of dA→B is zero and thus minimal.
Let nA > n
2
B, then the index is minimal when n
2
B types A have one link each and
nA − n2B have no links. Notice that any other distribution can be achieved starting
from the one above, by transferring links, one in a row from A to A′ when A has at
most the same number of links than A′. At each step A has one extra link and A′
19The formula does not imply that all possible niB are compatible at the same time. Due to the considered class
of networks types B connects to nB types A each. What is true is that, regardless of which types A are involved,
the sum across columns is the same.
has one link less. Any transfer in this fashion increases the index. It also increases
the variance of dA→B. To see that, let m ≡ n2B/nA denote the mean dA→B, which is
constant. Let the transfer be from an individual with nˆB links to an individual with
n˜B ≥ nˆB links. The variance of dA→B changes by α = (n˜B+1−m)2−(n˜B−m)2 and
β = (nˆB−1−m)2−(nˆB−m)2. Specifically α = 1+2n˜B−2m and β = 1−2nˆB+2m
and α + β = 2 + 2(n˜B − nˆB) ≥ 0. Thus, in any other distribution the variance is
higher. Let nA < n
2
B. Notice that there always exists an integer z ≥ 1 such
that znA ≤ n2B and (z + 1)nA ≥ n2B. Let the nA types have z links each and
n2B − znA ≤ nA types A have in addition one extra link each. The total number of
links is (n2B − znA)(z + 1) + (nA − (n2B − znA))z = n2B. Any other redistribution
starting form this one arises as above. Thus the index and the variance are positively
related and they are minimal in the proposed distribution.
Consider the class of networks in Proposition 3, point 2. Links reduce the in-
tensity of interactions (by reducing aij in the columns of A). Thus the maxi-
mal value of the index for types A obtains when just one type B is connected
to all A and the remaining nB − 1 types has each nB connections to types A.
Only notice that each A has nA + 1 links to start with, due to the type B con-
nected to all A. Again the only thing that matters for the index is how links
to B distribute and the result above applies. Thus whenever nB types A have
nB − 1 links each, the index is maximal. Thus, the maximal value of the index is
nB
nA + 1 + nB − 1 +
nA − nB
nA + 1
=
nB
nA + nB
+
nA − nB
nA + 1
. Focus now on the minimum
value of the index for networks in proposition 3, point 1. Let n2B = nA. The mini-
mum value of the index achieves when each A has just one link to types B. In this
case the minimum value of the index is
nA
nA + 1
=
nB
nA + 1
+
nA − nB
nA + 1
. This mini-
mum value of the index is higher that the maximum value above. Let n2B < nA. For
networks in proposition 3, point 1, the minimum value of the index achieves when
n2B types A have one link to types B each and nA−n2B types A have no links. In this
case the index is
n2B
nA + 1
+
nA − n2B
nA
>
n2B
nA + 1
+
nA − n2B
nA + 1
≥ nB
nA + nB
+
nA − nB
nA + 1
.
Thus, when n2B ≤ nA the minimum value of the index for networks in proposition 3,
point 1 is higher than the maximum value of the index for networks in proposition
3, point 2.
Consider now networks in proposition 3, point2. Let n˜B < nB types B connects
to all types A and the remaining nB − n˜B connects to nB types A each. Consider
networks in proposition1, point 1, such that nB − n˜B types B connects in the same
way than above to nB types A and the remaining n˜B types B connects each to nB
types A in either way. Regardless of the distribution of links of the latter n˜B types,
their counterparts in networks in proposition 3, point 2, have more links, in fact
they are connected to all A. Thus the value of the index have to be lower in this
case.
Finally, regarding types B, for networks in proposition 3, point 1 SSIB =
nB/2nB = 0.5 since each B is connected to all others of same type and also to
nB types A. For networks in proposition 3, point 2, the maximum value of the in-
dex is
nB − 1
2nB
+
1
nA + nB
< 0.5 when just one B connects to all A and the remaining
B connects to nB types A.

6 Appendix 1. Transfers when nA = nB = 2.
Consider network g2 in example 2, where uA∗ = uB∗ = δ − c + δ − C + δ2 and
uA = uB = δ − c+ δ2 + δ3.
A* B*
BA
(1) A and B do not form a link if tA ≥ δ − δ3 − C and/or tB ≥ δ − δ3 − C.
(2) A∗ and B do not form a link if tA∗ ≥ δ + δ2 − C and/or tB ≥ δ − δ3 − C.
(3) A and B∗ do not form a link if tB∗ ≥ δ + δ2 − C and/or tA ≥ δ − δ3 − C.
(4) A and A∗ do not delete their link if tA ≥ c− δ − δ2 − δ3 and tA∗ ≥ c− δ.
(5) B and B∗ do not delete their link if tB ≥ c− δ − δ2 − δ3 and tB∗ ≥ c− δ.
(6) A∗ and B∗ do not delete their link if tA∗ ≥ C − δ − δ2 and tB∗ ≥ C − δ − δ2.
Since CS is PS, C > δ+ δ2. By (6), tA∗ > 0 and tB > 0. Notice that (6) implies,
on the one hand, (2) and (3) and, on the other hand, (4) and (5), for tA∗ and tB∗ ,
respectively. From (4) and (5), tA ≥ c− δ − δ2 − δ3 and tB ≥ c− δ − δ2 − δ3 have
to hold. For tA and tB in (1) and (2), notice that both c− δ− δ2− δ3 ≥ δ− δ3−C
or c − δ − δ2 − δ3 < δ − δ3 − C may hold. Let c − δ − δ2 − δ3 ≥ δ − δ3 − C hold.
That implies that C+ c ≥ 2δ+ δ2. Thus, (4) and (5) imply (1) and (2) for A and B.
Transfers are such that: tA∗ ≥ C− δ− δ2, tB∗ ≥ C− δ− δ2, tA ≥ c− δ− δ2− δ3 and
tB ≥ c−δ−δ2−δ3. Now notice that δ+δ2+δ3−c ≥ C−δ−δ2. The contrary would
imply that C + c > 2δ + 2δ2 + δ3 which is a contradiction since C < δ + 2δ2 + δ3
and c ≤ δ − δ2. Hence there are transfer rules that make the bridge network PS.
The egalitarian transfer rule makes any network PS. Another rule is the one under
which A∗ and B∗ receive C − δ − δ2. That is, they are exactly compensated for
the loss they experience when linking, with ti = C − δ − δ2, i = A,B. Finally, let
tA = tB = c− δ− δ2− δ3. Since uA = uB = δ− c+ δ2 + δ3 this transfer leaves types
A and B with zero utility, all of it being transferred to A∗ and B∗.
7 Appendix 2. Stability and efficiency whenever δi and βi
differ across individuals.
This appendix reexamines equilibrium networks when:
ui(g) =

∑
j∈g
δ
d(i,j)
i −
∑
j∈Ni(g)
cij if p ≥ 0.5∑
j∈g
β
d(i,j)
i −
∑
j∈Ni(g)
cij if p < 0.5.
Proposition 8. Let nA = nB. Then:
1. CI is PS iff
C ≤ min
i
δi − δ2i .
2. CS is PS iff
c ≤ min
i
δi − δ2i
and for no pair of individuals such that t(i) 6= t(j), it holds that
C < δi + δ
2
i (nB − 1) and C < δj + δ2j (nA − 1).
Proof of Proposition 8. CI. Conditions (1)-(2) in the proof of proposition 1 are in-
dividual specific. For CI to be PS, the restrictions below have to hold:
c ≤ min
i
(δi − βi)(n− 1) + βi − β2i . (34)
C ≤ min
i
δi − δ2i . (35)
In this case RHS (34) < RHS (33). To see that, consider different pairs (βi, δi),
(βj , δj),...,(βk, δk). Consider i ≡ argminm δm− δ2m and j ≡ argminm (n− 1)(βm−
δm) + δm − δ2m, m = 1, 2..., n. Let j = i. By the proof of Proposition 1, RHS (34)
< RHS (33). Let j 6= i. In this case the RHS (34) is the smallest for the pair i. In
particular the RHS (34) is smaller for i than for j, otherwise it would not be the
minimum. Moreover, the RHS of (33) at j > RHS (34) at j > RHS (34) at i. Thus
the RHS (34) has to be smaller than the RHS of (33).
CS. Conditions (3)-(4) in the proof of Proposition 1 are individual specific. Thus,
no individual breaks a link with a similar type if:
c ≤ min
i
δi − δ2i . (36)
Further there cannot be two individuals of different type, such that C < δi +
δ2i (nB − 1) and C < δj + δ2j (nA − 1), i 6= j, since in this case they link.

Proposition 9. Let nA − 1 > nB. Then:
1. CI is PS iff
C ≤ min{ min
i:t(i)=A
δi − δ2i , min
i:t(i)=B
βi − β2i }.
2. CS is PS under the same conditions than in Proposition 8.
Proof of Proposition 9. CI. Conditions (5)-(8) in the proof of Proposition 2 are in-
dividual specific. For CS to be PS, the restrictions below have to hold:
c ≤ min
i:t(i)=A
δi − δ2i . (37)
C ≤ min
i:t(i)=A
δi − δ2i . (38)
c ≤ min
i:t(i)=B
βi − β2i . (39)
C ≤ min
i:t(i)=B
βi − β2i . (40)
Since c<C, (37) and (39) guarantee that CS is PS. Thus:
C ≤ min{ min
i:t(i)=A
δi − δ2i , min
i:t(i)=B
βi − β2i } (41)
CS. The proof is analogous than the one of Proposition 8.

Proposition 10. Let nA − 1 = nB. Then:
1. CI is PS iff
C ≤ min{ min
i:t(i)=A
δi − δ2i , min
i:t(i)=B
(n− 1)(βi − δi) + δi − δ2i }.
2. CS is PS under the same conditions than in Proposition 8.
Proof of Proposition 10. CI. Conditions (5)-(7) and (9) in the proof of Proposition
2 are individual specific. The restrictions below have to hold:
c ≤ min
i:t(i)=A
δi − δ2i . (42)
C ≤ min
i:t(i)=A
δi − δ2i . (43)
c ≤ min
i:t(i)=B
βi − β2i . (44)
C ≤ min
i:t(i)=B
(n− 1)(βi − δi) + δi − δ2i . (45)
For types A (42) has to hold. Since c<C (42) implies (41). For types B, (43)
and (44) have to hold. It turns out that RHS (44) < RHS (43). Consider the pairs
(βi, δi), (βj , δj),...,(βk, δk). Let i ≡ argminm βm − β2m and j ≡ argminm (n −
1)(βm − δm) + δm − δ2m, m = 1, 2..., nB. Let j = i. By the proof of Proposition 2,
RHS (44) < RHS (43). Let j 6= i. The RHS (44) is the smallest for the pair j. In
particular the RHS (44) is smaller for j than for i, otherwise j would not minimize
that expression. Moreover, the RHS of (43) at i > RHS (44) at i > RHS (44) at
j. Thus RHS (44) < RHS (43) has to hold. Thus, compare (42) and (44). When
among types B, βi = 0.5 ∀ i, δi = {0.51, 0.52} and n = 11, RHS (44) is 0.15 and
0.049 respectively. When among types A, δi = {0.51, 0.52} RHS (42) > RHS (44),
thus (44) is the most restrictive. Further, when among types A, δi ≤ 0.05, the RHS
(42) ≤ 0.048, and hence the most restrictive.
CS. See the proof of Proposition 8.

Proposition 11. Let CI be PS. Whenever nA = nB or nA − 1 = nB CI is socially
preferable to CS. Whenever nA − 1 > nB either CI is socially preferable to CS or
vice versa. Let CS be PS. Then either CI is socially preferable to CS or vice versa.
explain that
Proof of Proposition 11. First, let CI be PS. The value of CS and CI are the anal-
ogous to the ones in expressions, (27) and (28) respectively. When nA = nB the
value of CI further incorporates (apart form the value of same type links which is
the same in CI and CS) the value of links with different types, nB
∑nA
i=1(δi − C) +
nA
∑nB
i=1(δi − C). By Proposition 8, for CI to be PS it has to be that:
C ≤ min
i
δi − δ2i . (46)
The claim is that (45) implies that C < δi for each i. Thus CI is socially preferable
to CS. To see that, first consider that the RHS (45) minimizes at δk > 0.5. Hence
C ≤ δk−δ2k. Notice that δi ∈ [1−δk, δk] for each individual i, otherwise δk would not
minimize (45). In particular δi = 1−δk is the minimum value that δi might take. Let
C > 1−δk. That implies that C > 1−δk+(1−δk)2 = δk−δ2k, which is a contradiction.
Second, consider that δk < 0.5. In this case that δi ∈ [δk, 1− δk] for each individual
i, otherwise δk would not minimize (45). It holds that C ≤ δk − δ2k < δk. Thus C is
smaller than any other δi ∈ [δk, 1 − δk].20 When nA > nB, focus on the analogs of
(27) and (29). The value of CS is:
20The case in which δk = 0.5 requires that any other δi = 0.5 othewise 0.5 would not minimize (45), hence it is
the case in which δi = δ for all i as in the main body.
(nA − 1)
nA∑
i=1
(δi − c) + (nB − 1)
nB∑
i=1
(δi − c). (47)
The value of CI is:
(nA− 1)
nA∑
i=1
(δi− c) + (nB − 1)
nB∑
i=1
(βi− c) +nB
nA∑
i=1
(δi−C) +nA
nB∑
i=1
(βi− c). (48)
Let (46) > (47), that is let:
(nB− 1)
nB∑
i=1
(δi− c) ≥ (nB− 1)
nB∑
i=1
(βi− c) +nB
nA∑
i=1
(δi−C) +nA
nB∑
i=1
(βi− c). (49)
or
(nB − 1)
nB∑
i=1
(δi − βi) ≥ nB
nA∑
i=1
(δi − C) + nA
nB∑
i=1
(βi − c). (50)
The claim is that (49) cannot hold. There are two cases. First, Let nA− 1 = nB,
then CS is PS iff C ≤ min{mini:t(i)=A δi− δ2i ,mini:t(i)=B (n− 1)(βi− δi) + δi− δ2i }.
(see proposition 10). The minimum of these two values has to be positive, otherwise
CI is not PS. Thus, for every pair (βi, δi) for types B, βi ≥ (n− 2)δi
n− 1 +
δ2i
n− 1 and
in particular for the pair (βi, δi) that minimizes (n − 1)(βi − δi) + δi − δ2i . Let
βi =
(n− 2)δi
n− 1 +
δ2i
n− 1 for every individual i of type B. In this case the LHS (49)
is as high as possible and the RHS (49) is as small as possible, everything else fixed.
The claim is that even in that case:
(nB − 1)
nB∑
i=1
(δi − βi) ≥ nA
nB∑
i=1
(βi − c) (51)
cannot hold, and hence (49) cannot hold. In particular it has to hold that:
nB∑
i=1
(δi − βi) <
nB∑
i=1
(βi − c). (52)
Suppose in contrast that it holds that:
nB∑
i=1
(δi − 2βi + c) ≥ 0. (53)
Notice that for every i, δi − 2βi = δi − 2
[
(n− 2)δi
n− 1 +
δ2i
n− 1
]
=
(3− n)δi
n− 1 −
2δ2i
n− 1 < 0 and hence, c > (n − 1)
−1((n − 3)δi + 2δ2i ) > 0, for some summands in
(52) to be non-negative. Notice that (n − 1)−1((n − 3)δi + 2δ2i ) increases with n.
Thus it takes the minimum value at n = 3. In this case c > δ2i . Recall that c < C ≤
(n−1)(βi−δi)+δi−δ2i has to hold for every pair, since in particular costs are smaller
than mini:t(i)=B (n−1)(βi−δi)+δi−δ2i }. Recall also that βi = (n−1)−1((n−2)δi+δ2i .
Both inequalities on c are compatible whenever δ2i < (n−1)(βi−δi)+δi−δ2i for the
considered βi. However that implies that 2δ
2
i < 2δ
2
i − δi, which is a contradiction.
Hence every summand in (52) is negative. As a consequence, was nB − 1 = nA
(50) could not hold, so it cannot hold either for nB − 1 < nA. That implies that
the RHS(49) > LHS(49), which contradicts the assumption that CS is socially
preferable to CI. Second, let nA−1 > nB, then CI is PS iff C ≤ min{mini:t(i)=A δi−
δ2i ,mini:t(i)=B βi− β2i }, (see proposition 9). Let nA = 11 with 3 individuals defined
by (δ1, β1) = (0.002, 0.0001), 3 individuals defined by (δ2, β2) = (0.09, 0.0002) and
5 individuals defined by (δ3, β3) = (0.18, 0.0003). Let nB = 9 with 3 individuals
defined by (δ1, β1) = (0.3, 0.01), 3 individuals defined by (δ2, β2) = (0.4, 0.02) and 3
individuals defined by (δ3, β3) = (0.6, 0.2). In this case, for types B, βi−β2i takes the
minimum value of 0.0099 at β1 = 0.01 and for types A, δi − δ2i takes the minimum
value of 0.001996 at δ1 = 0.002. Hence set c = 0.0017 < C = 0.0018 < 0.001996.
In this case the value of CI, according to (47) is 34.78. The value of CS according
to (46) is 42.63. Hence CS is socially preferable to CI. Now, for types B, change
parameters to (δ1, β1) = (0.3, 0.29), 3 individuals defined by (δ2, β2) = (0.4, 0.39)
and 3 individuals defined by (δ3, β3) = (0.6, 0.4). In this case, for types B, βi − β2i
takes the minimum value of 0.2059 at β1 = 0.29. The minimum of types A is the
same. Thus, let c = 0.0017 < C = 0.0018 < 0.001996. In this case the value of CI,
according to (47) is 83.23. The value of CS according to (46) is 42.63. Hence CI is
socially preferable to CS.
Second, let CS be PS. Thus conditions in Proposition 8 are satisfied. For nA = nB
the values of CS and CI differ by nB
∑nA
i=1(δi−C) +nA
∑nB
i=1(δi−C). Let δi = 0.8
and δi = 0.5 for A and B, resp.. Let nA = nB = 11. For C ∈ (0.5 + 10(0.52), 0.8 +
10(0.82)) = (3, 7.2) and c ≤ 0.8 − 0.82 CS is PS. Since C > δi ∀ i, CI is socially
preferable to CS. Let δi = 0.8 and δi = 0.1 for A and B, resp. Let nA = nB = 2. For
C ∈ (0.1+0.12, 0.8+0.82) = (0.11, 1.44) and c ≤ 0.1−0.12 CS is PS. Let C > 1 > δi,
∀ i, then CI is socially preferable to CS. Let C = 0.2, then nB
∑nA
i=1(δi − C) =
2(0.8−0.2+0.8−0.2) = 2.4 and nA
∑nB
i=1(δi−C) = 2(0.11−0.2+0.11−0.2) = −0.36.
Thus CI is socially preferable to CS.
Let nA > nB. The focus is on expression (49). Let individuals of type A be
defined by δi = 0.8 and βi ∈ (0, 1) (possibly) different across individuals. Let types
B be defined by (δi, βi) = (0.1, 0.09) Let nB = 2 and nA = 3. In this case for
C ∈ (0.11, 2.08) and c = 0.05 < 0.1 − 0.12 = 0.09 CS is PS. For C = 0.2 (49) does
not hold. Specifically its LHS takes value 2(0.1− 0.09) = 0.02 while its RHS takes
value 6(0.8 − 0.2) + 6(0.09 − 0.05) = 3.84. When nB = 2 and nA > 3 the same
holds. Thus CI is socially preferable to CS. On the contrary, whenever, everything
else equal, C = 1.2 the RHS (49) is negative. Thus CS is socially preferable to CI.

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